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Decontextualization of Musical Works: 
Should the Doctrine of Moral Rights be 
Extended? 
Sarah C. Anderson* 
INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of moral rights protects the non-pecuniary 
interests of an artist in his or her work.  The doctrine evolved from 
a “societal concern about individual author’s and artist’s 
personality and reputation investments as they are exhibited 
through their creative work.”1  Civil law countries such as France 
have broad moral rights doctrines whereas the United States places 
emphasis on the economic concerns of artists.  Thus, for a 
significant part of the history of the United States, the federal 
legislature and courts were reluctant to recognize the doctrine of 
moral rights.2  For various reasons, the United States eventually 
changed to provide some moral rights for artists, particularly those 
who created works of visual art.  Some scholars, however, suggest 
that moral rights should be extended to protect musicians against 
violations of their moral rights.  This Note discusses the specific 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2007; B.S. Allegheny College, 
2003.  The author would like to thank Professor Benjamin Zipursky for his assistance and 
encouragement and the members of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & 
Entertainment Law Journal who contributed to the completion of this Note. 
 1 Calvin D. Peeler, From the Providence of Kings to Copyrighted Things (and French 
Moral Rights), 9 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 426 (1999). 
 2 See generally SHELDON W. HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY 
AND MORAL RIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONALITY 
INTERESTS, 635–637 (2d ed. 1993). 
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argument that musicians should be protected from the 
decontextualization of their musical works.3 
Decontextualization is the use of an artist’s work in a context 
with which the artist disapproves, thereby altering the integrity of 
the work.4  In addition to arguing for such an extension, at least 
one scholar, Rajan Desai,5 has proposed a moral rights scheme that 
he argues should be implemented to protect musicians against 
violations of their moral rights via decontextualization.  Although 
it may be true that musicians should be afforded greater control 
over their work, this Note asserts that the arguments in favor of 
protecting musicians against the decontextualization of their 
musical works via moral rights are fatally flawed. 
Part I of this Note outlines the fundamentals of moral rights 
doctrine, focusing specifically on France as an example.  Also 
included in Part I is a discussion of the development of limited 
protections of moral rights in the United States, including certain 
provisions of copyright law, the Lanham Act, the Berne 
Convention and the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”).6  
Part I also discusses unique aspects of the music industry that are 
pertinent to an analysis of moral rights and music. 
Part II explores the debate over the extension of moral rights to 
protect against decontextualization of musical works.  Opinions 
from cases such as Shostakovich et al. v. Twentieth Century-Fox 
Film Corp.7 and Franconero v. Universal Music Corp.8 illustrate 
the reluctance of courts in the United States to extend the doctrine 
of moral rights to provide such protection.  The arguments used by 
proponents of the extension are provided, and Desai’s proposed 
moral rights scheme is also presented in detail in Part II. 
Part III discusses the flaws in Desai’s specific proposal as well 
as the various weaknesses in scholars’ arguments for the extension 
 
 3 See Rajan Desai, Music Licensing, Performance Rights Societies, and Moral Rights 
for Music: A Need in the Current U.S. Music Licensing Scheme and a Way to Provide 
Moral Rights, 10 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1 (2001). 
 4 See id. 
 5 See id. 
 6 See id. 
 7 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1948). 
 8 No. 02CV1963, 2003 WL 22990060 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2003). 
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of moral rights.  Proponents often rely on legislation such as 
VARA in formulating arguments for the extension of moral rights.  
Part III thus thoroughly examines VARA, concluding that, were 
the legislation to apply to musical works, it would not protect 
musicians from the decontextualization of their creations. 
This Note rejects arguments in favor of extending the doctrine 
of moral rights to protect against the decontextualization of 
musical works.  In a legal system historically disinclined to 
recognize the doctrine of moral rights, the adoption of such an 
extension seems unlikely.  Until proponents of the extension 
suggest a workable moral rights scheme and provide more 
persuasive arguments, the doctrine of moral rights should not be 
extended to protect musicians against the decontextualization of 
their musical works. 
It should be noted that this discussion is limited to a very 
specific issue.  The pertinent question is whether proponents set 
forth valid arguments for the extension of moral rights to protect 
against the decontextualization of musical works.  Thus, various 
issues are set aside and questions remain unanswered in order to 
facilitate a detailed exploration of the arguments dealing 
specifically with the decontextualization of musical works. 
I. MORAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE, PROTECTIONS OF ARTISTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 
A. Moral Rights Doctrine 
Moral rights doctrine seeks to protect the non-pecuniary 
interests of an artist in his or her work.9  France is considered the 
leader in the field of moral rights doctrine, and the term “moral 
right” is a rough translation of the French term “droits moral.”10  
The doctrine of moral rights “spring[s] from a belief that an artist 
in the process of creation injects his spirit into the work and that 
 
 9 See Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of 
Artists’ Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1, 3 (1980). 
 10 See Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 41, 41–42 (1998). 
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the artist’s personality, as well as the integrity of the work, should 
therefore be protected and preserved.”11  The moral right is thus 
attached to the artist, rather than the work, and thus “remains 
vested in the artist even after the object itself has been 
transferred.”12 
A highly developed moral rights doctrine generally includes 
five separate rights, which include the rights of attribution, 
integrity, disclosure, withdrawal, and resale royalties.13  For the 
purposes of this discussion, only the rights of attribution and 
integrity require further treatment. 
The right of attribution ensures that an artist’s name will be 
properly associated with his or her work.14  This is the least 
controversial of the rights protected by the doctrine,15 and actually 
includes three separate rights: 1.) the right to be recognized as the 
creator of the work or to use a pseudonym or remain anonymous, 
2.) the right to prevent the artist’s work from being attributed to 
someone else and 3.) the right to prevent the artist’s name “from 
being used on works which he did not in fact create.”16 
The right of integrity is “considered by virtually all scholars to 
be the most essential part of droit moral.”17  This right generally 
allows the author to prevent changes that would deform or mutilate 
his work, even after he has transferred the work to another 
owner.18  An example of such mutilation would be the extensive 
editing of a film to the extent that the end product no longer 
accurately reflected the work of the creator.19  In some countries, 
such as France, the right of integrity also allows the artist to 
prevent the use of his work in a context that would change the 
 
 11 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 12 DaSilva, supra note 9, at 12. 
 13 See Liemer, supra note 10, at 46–47. 
 14 See id. at 47. 
 15 See DaSilva, supra note 9, at 28. 
 16 Id. at 26. 
 17 Id. at 31. 
 18 See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
 19 See generally Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d 
Cir. 1976). 
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meaning of the work or harm the artist’s reputation.20  The right of 
integrity, however, has not traditionally been applied to protect the 
artist from complete destruction of his work.21  Professor Susan P. 
Liemer has noted that “[w]hile losing the work entirely may seem 
the ultimate blow to the artist, the underlying idea is the artist’s 
creative efforts and personal expressions cannot be misrepresented 
by something that does not exist.”22 
B. Protection of Moral Rights in the United States 
In France, “moral rights are independent from and superior to 
any pecuniary interest in a work of art.”23  In contrast, the law of 
the United States “seeks to protect primarily the author’s pecuniary 
and exploitative interests.”24  This is the principal reason that the 
United States was reluctant to recognize an artist’s moral rights 
and still does not have a broad moral rights doctrine.  Before the 
United States became a signatory to the Berne Convention, courts 
refused to recognize the doctrine of moral rights.25  In certain 
cases, however, courts would protect an artist’s moral rights by 
applying United States copyright law as well as the Lanham Act.26  
After signing on to the Berne Convention, which many scholars 
 
 20 See Soc. Le Chant de Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe et Soc. Fox Americaine Twentieth 
Century, Judgment of Jan. 13, 1954, 1 Gax. Pal. 191 [1954] D.A. 16, 80 (Cour d’Appel 
Paris) (granting an injunction enjoining Twentieth Century Fox from further use of 
plaintiffs-composers’ music in a film because the context of the music created an 
implication that the composers were disloyal to their government). 
 21 See Liemer, supra note 10, at 51. 
 22 Id. 
 23 DaSilva, supra note 9, at 4. 
 24 Id. at 3. 
 25 See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2nd Cir. 
1976) (“American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or 
provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the 
economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors.”), Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian 
Church, 194 Misc. 570, 576 (1940) (“[T]he claim of this plaintiff that an artist retains in 
his work after it has been unconditionally sold, where such rights are related to the 
protection of his artistic reputation, is not supported by the decisions of our courts.”),  
Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579 (Sup. Ct. 
1948), aff’d, 275 App. Div. 695, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1st Dept. 1949) (“In the present state 
of our law the very existence of the right is not clear, the relative position of the rights 
thereunder with reference to the rights of others is not defined nor has the nature of the 
proper remedy been determined.”). 
 26 Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24–25. 
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argue was done only to ease international criticism, Congress 
amended the Copyright law to include greater moral rights 
protection for the visual arts.  Thus, although artists in the United 
States are not protected by a sweeping moral rights doctrine, such 
as that adopted in France, they are not completely without redress 
in the case of a violation of their moral rights.  This section 
discusses the development of such protections within the United 
States.  Specifically, this section first explores moral rights 
protections provided in Copyright law, then Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, the Berne Convention and finally VARA, an 
amendment to the Copyright law enacted after the United States 
became a signatory to the Berne Convention. 
1. Copyright 
United States copyright law provides some protection of an 
artist’s moral rights.  Regarding the specific issue of protecting 
musicians’ works, copyright provides what would be categorized 
as a protection of the right of integrity of a musical work when it is 
being performed, or covered, by another artist via a compulsory 
mechanical license.27  Under United States law, the owner of the 
copyright in a musical work would be protected from the 
deformation or mutilation, but not the decontextualization, of the 
work.28  This limited protection is illustrated by the language used 
in the copyright legislation: 
A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a 
musical arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to 
conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the 
performance involved, but the arrangement shall not 
change the basic melody or fundamental character of the 
work . . . .29 
This provision demonstrates the balancing of the interests of 
the artists in protecting the integrity of their work with the interests 
of other artists in using the work as their own artistic and learning 
 
 27 See Desai, supra note 3, at 5–6. 
 28 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 115(a)(2) (2000). 
 29 Id. 
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tool.30  In this narrow area of compulsory mechanical licenses, the 
copyright law “works to further the goal of developing musicians 
through cover music while still protecting the artist and song 
through moral rights.”31 
2. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
Courts will sometimes apply Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
in a way which provides protection of an artist’s moral rights.32  
Most often, courts interpret the Lanham Act to provide for the 
moral right of attribution so that an artist receives proper 
recognition for his or her work.33  The Lanham Act creates a cause 
of action for an artist when another person uses the artist’s work in 
interstate commerce, in a way which “misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin . . .” of the work.34 
Some courts have interpreted the Lanham Act as providing 
more than just the moral right of attribution, but also the right of 
integrity.  For example, in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting 
Companies, Inc.,35 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
determined that the extreme editing of a film by a broadcast 
company constituted a violation of the Lanham Act.36  The court 
noted that “the edited version . . . impaired the integrity of [the] 
work and represented to the public as the product of appellants 
what was actually a mere caricature of their talents.  We believe 
that a valid cause of action for such distortion exists . . . .”37 
It should be noted, however, that an artist’s redress for 
violations of moral rights under the Lanham Act are limited in that 
they must satisfy three requirements in order to have a viable claim 
under Section 43(a).  These requirements are: 1.) that the goods or 
services “in question must be involved in interstate commerce,” 2.) 
 
 30 See Desai, supra note 3, at 6. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See Natalie C. Suhl, Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne 
Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203, 
1218 (2002). 
 33 See id. 
 34 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 35 See 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 36 See id. at 25. 
 37 Id. 
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that the claimant must prove that they have standing to sue under 
the Lanham Act, which is achieved by demonstrating “either a 
competitive or commercial injury, which maintains a causal link to 
misleading information” and 3.) that the claimant have “a genuine 
interest protected by the act.”38  The artist’s protection is also 
limited by the purpose of the Lanham Act, which is to prevent 
consumer deception.39  Due to this limited purpose, the artist is 
only protected “where overt mutilations occur to the extent that the 
character of the work is changed so as to present a false 
designation of origin.”40  Thus, even if an artist’s work is 
deformed, if the public is not confused in regards to its origin, the 
artist would not have a claim under the Lanham Act.41 
3. The Berne Convention 
In 1988, the United States signed on to the Berne Convention.42  
The United States debated becoming a signatory for nearly 100 
years due primarily to the Berne Convention’s inclusion of Article 
6bis, which requires protection of the moral rights of attribution 
and integrity.43  Article 6bis states: 
Independent of the author’s economic rights, and even after 
the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right 
to claim authorship of the work and to object to any 
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other 
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would 
be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.44 
Once the United States joined the Berne Convention, Congress 
passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988.45  The 
Implementation Act stated that the United States would adhere to 
 
 38 Suhl, supra note 32, at 1219. 
 39 See id. at 1227. 
 40 Id. at 1228. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See id at 1212. 
 43 See H.R. Rep. 101–514, H.R. Rep. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1990, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917 (1990). 
 44 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 21886, 
art. 6bis, S. Treaty Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1986). 
 45 Pub. L. No. 100–568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). 
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the Berne Convention in the most limited sense, noting that 
American law already provided adequate protection for the rights 
included in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.46  For example, 
laws dealing with unfair competition, copyright, contract, 
defamation, and privacy were noted as sufficient protections of an 
artist’s moral rights in their work.47 
After signing on to the Berne Convention, Congress also 
inserted a limiting provision into the United States Copyright law, 
which stated: 
Any rights in a work eligible for protection under this title 
that derive from this title, other Federal or State statutes, or 
the common law, shall not be expanded or reduced by 
virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne 
Convention, or the adherence of the United States thereto.48 
Some argue that the United States thus “joined the Berne 
Convention to ease international criticism, while bowing to 
domestic pressure by avoiding direct protection of Moral Rights 
through a recycled argument of indirect protection.”49 
4. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 
In 1990, Congress enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act 
(“VARA”), an amendment to United State Copyright law.50  
VARA creates moral rights for limited categories of work.51  
Musical works are excluded from the works protected by the 
amendment.52  If an artistic work does fall within the definition of 
 
 46 Id. 
 47 See Suhl, supra note 32, at 1213. 
 48 17 U.S.C.A. § 104(c). 
 49 Suhl, supra note 32, at 1213. 
 50 Pub. L. No. 101-650 (tit. VI), 104 Stat. 5089, 5128-33 (1990). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. § 602.  Section 101 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by inserting after 
the paragraph defining “widow” the following: 
A ‘work of visual art’ is— 
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a 
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively 
numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, 
or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the 
author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or 
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“a work of visual art,” the artist is granted the moral rights of 
attribution and integrity; and in the case of a work of “recognized 
stature,” the right to prevent destruction of the work.53  VARA also 
states that the rights provided in the amendment may not be 
transferred but may be waived via a written “instrument signed by 
the author.”54 
Under VARA’s grant of the right of attribution, the author of a 
work of visual art has the rights to claim authorship of the work,55 
prevent the use of his name on art which he did not create,56 and 
prevent the use of his name on his work in the event that it has 
been distorted, mutilated, or modified in a way “which would be 
prejudicial to his . . . honor or reputation.”57  VARA’s protection of 
the right of integrity grants the visual artist the right “to prevent 
any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that 
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or 
reputation.”58  The right of integrity also gives the artist the right to 
“prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature.”59  
Recovery for the violation of such rights is limited in several ways, 
including when the modification is the result of the passing of 
 
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing 
in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. 
A work of visual art does not include— 
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, 
applied art, motion picture or other audio-visual work, book, magazine, 
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic 
publication, or similar publication; 
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, 
or packaging material or container; 
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii); 
(B) any work made for hire; or 
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title. 
Id. 
 53 Id. § 603 (2000). 
 54 Id. (2000). 
 55 See 17 USCA § 106A(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 56 See id. § 106A(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 57 Id. § 106A(a)(2) (2000). 
 58 Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2000).  This section also states that any “intentional distortion, 
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right.” 
 59 Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2000).  This section also states that any “intentional or grossly 
negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.” 
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time, the nature of the materials, or the conservation or public 
presentation of the work.60  Finally, the rights protected by VARA 
belong only to the creator of the work of visual art, whether or not 
that artist is the copyright owner.61 
Some states have passed statutes that provide artists with moral 
rights protections.62  Like VARA, state statutes remain unavailable 
to musicians because protections are limited to the fine arts.63  
Musicians may try to rely on state common law and seek moral 
rights protection under state unfair competition laws, contract law, 
defamation, or privacy.64  However, such laws seem unlikely to 
protect a musician as adequately as a sculptor would be protected 
by statutes, such as VARA, which explicitly recognize the rights of 
attribution and integrity.65 
State and Federal moral rights legislation is thus very limited, 
especially when compared the law of droit moral in France.  
Applying moral rights doctrine only to the fine arts, or the 
narrower category of visual arts, “is far more limited than the 
French law, which applies to virtually all art forms, and which 
contains no restrictions based on the prominence of the artist or the 
work.”66 
 
 60 See id. § 106A(c) (2000). 
 61 See id. § 106A(b) (2000). 
 62 See Desai, supra note 3, at 16. 
 63 See id. 
 64 See id. 
 65 See id.  Desai states: 
For state unfair competition remedies, one could theoretically obtain protection 
if their name is misappropriated, but this is still tied to contract law, and any 
remedy under contract law depends on the contract.  Violations under state 
unfair competition law does not present a claim of moral rights in and of itself.  
Defamation presents an option for artists, but relates to harming an author’s 
character, and though similar to the right of integrity, it does not cover 
destruction of the work itself, which results in much less extensive protection 
than the moral right of integrity.  Lastly, an artist could attempt to seek 
protection under invasion of privacy, but like defamation, such an action still 
ties to use of the author’s name and not the work.  Like defamation, such 
privacy claims would not provide extensive protection as a substitute for moral 
rights or a “quasi form of moral rights. 
Id. 
 66 DaSilva, supra note 9, at 49. 
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C. Aspects of the Music Industry 
In order to draw any conclusions as to whether moral rights 
doctrine in the United States should be extended to afford greater 
protection for musicians, particularly protection against the 
decontextualization of musical works, an exploration of certain 
unique aspects of the music industry is required.  Music licensing, 
performance rights societies, and the presence of unequal 
bargaining power in negotiations for recording contracts are 
especially pertinent to this discussion. 
United States copyright law regulates music licenses, which 
include “print licenses, types of mechanical licenses, types of 
synchronization licenses, performance licenses, and dramatic 
performance and adaptation rights.”67  Only mechanical, 
synchronization, and performance licenses warrant further 
discussion.  Mechanical licenses permit “reproduction of music in 
forms that use a mechanical device to play sound, such as records 
or compact disks.”68  As mentioned previously, copyright 
provisions regulating compulsory mechanical licenses provide a 
form of moral rights protection for the right of integrity.69  
Synchronization (“synch”) licenses allow the “licensee to use . . . a 
musical work in an audiovisual work, such as a motion picture or 
television show.”70  Finally, a performance license “allows one to 
perform a musical work publicly, and such a license is based on 
the copyright owner’s exclusive right to perform the musical 
work.”71 
A problem arises in the area of performance licenses and public 
performance of a musician’s work—it is impossible for musicians 
to police all public performances of their work to ensure “their 
economic interest in the performance right.”72  Performance rights 
societies help resolve this problem by policing public places and 
 
 67 Desai, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
 68 Id. at 5. 
 69 See supra Part I(B)(2). 
 70 Desai, supra note 3, at 9. 
 71 Id. at 7. 
 72 Id. 
ANDERSON 5/18/2006  11:34 AM 
2006] DECONTEXTUALIZATION OF MUSICAL WORKS 881 
 
ensuring that artists receive payment for the use of their work.73  
The owner of a music copyright, in joining a performance right 
society, gives the society the authority to sublicense the 
copyrighted work.74  Scholar Rajan Desai explains, generally, the 
relationship between the music copyright holder, the performance 
rights society, and the licensees, stating: 
A person or entity that desires to obtain a performance 
license from a performing rights society can pay an annual 
fee for a blanket license that allows the licensee to perform 
one or more titles in the society’s music catalog.  A per 
program license is also available to television stations 
seeking a license from a performing rights society.  After 
receiving payment, a performing rights society distributes 
royalties to the music writer and publisher. 
. . . .  
Performing rights groups like ASCAP monitor the use of 
songs in their catalog and have authorization from members 
to bring suit against infringers.75 
It is thus generally considered in the artist’s best interest to join 
a performance rights society, and many record labels require artists 
to do so.76 
The final important aspect of the music industry for this 
discussion is the process of negotiating recording contracts and the 
inequality of bargaining power inherent in the industry.  
Musicians, particularly new artists, often find that they retain little 
control over their work once they have signed a contract.77  
Popular music contracts traditionally transfer to the publisher all 
 
 73 See id. (noting that “performance rights societies include the American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and 
SESAC, Inc. formerly known as the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers.  
These groups license use of musical works, police their use, and distribute royalties based 
on use of these works.”). 
 74 Id. at 9. 
 75 Id.  
 76 See id. at 7–9. 
 77 Id. at 19. 
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rights in copyright.78  Also, if a record company merges with or is 
sold to another company, the contract with the original company 
can be assigned to the new company.79  This means that 
“musicians may find themselves in contracts with new record 
companies that may not treat their music properly.”80  A 
musician’s interest in how his or her music is used is thus often 
ignored, especially when the musician is a new artist because “only 
the most well-known artists are able to procure by contract those 
rights which the law has not yet seen fit to protect.”81 
II. DEBATING THE EXTENSION OF MORAL RIGHTS TO PROTECT 
AGAINST DECONTEXTUALIZATION OF MUSICAL WORKS 
Many scholars argue that the United States should adopt a 
more comprehensive moral rights scheme,82 such as the droit 
moral in France, and that moral rights protections for musicians 
are especially lacking.83  The narrower issue, for the purposes of 
this discussion, is whether moral rights protection should be 
extended to musical works in such a manner as would forbid use 
by a non-composer, in certain contexts, with which the original 
composer does not agree.  Put differently, should the United States 
extend moral rights doctrine to protect a musician from the 
decontextualization of his or her work? 
 
 78 Id. at 18. 
 79 Id. at 19. 
 80 Id. 
 81 DaSilva, supra note 9, at 56; see also Desai, supra note 3, at 20–21(noting that 
“newer artists tend to sign contracts that allow record companies to license [synch] rights 
without their consent, whereas established artists can negotiate a requirement for their 
consent in synch licenses.”). 
 82 See, eg., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American 
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985); Edward J. Damich, The Right of 
Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 
GA. L. REV. 1 (1988); Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795 (2001); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Autho–Stories:” 
Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
 83 See, eg., Desai, supra note 3; Patrick G. Zabatta, Moral Rights and Musical Works: 
Are Composers Getting Berned?, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095 (1992). 
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Part A of this section explores the reluctance of legislatures and 
court to expand the doctrine of moral rights.  Part B introduces the 
arguments in favor of extending moral rights to protect against the 
decontextualization of musical works.  Finally, Part C sets forth 
scholar Rajan Desai’s proposed moral rights scheme. 
 
A. Shostakovich and Franconero: Exploring the Reluctance to 
Expand Moral Rights Doctrine 
Legislatures and courts in the United States refuse to extend 
moral rights doctrine to grant musicians a moral rights claim.  
Scholars such as DaSilva argue that droit moral, as it exists in 
France, may not be adopted in the United States “without a 
complete overhaul of our copyright law and its implicit conception 
of the relationship between artists and society.”84  In addition, 
DaSilva argues that “[w]e may find, too, that the moral rights 
doctrine is not worth the ideological transformation which it might 
require.”85  Courts that have dealt with the issue of 
decontextualization in the United States apparently agree with such 
arguments. 
The case that best illustrates the position of American courts on 
this issue is Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.86  
In that case, the New York Supreme Court for New York County 
dismissed a claim by four Soviet Russian composers who sought to 
enjoin the use of their music, which was in the public domain and 
thus enjoyed no copyright protection.87  Twentieth Century-Fox 
produced a picture entitled “The Iron Curtain”, a film of 87 
minutes which had an anti-Soviet theme.88  The film reproduced 
plaintiffs’ music for a total time of 45 minutes.89  The composers 
argued that the use of their music indicated their approval of the 
 
 84 DaSilva, supra note 9, at 57. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 
1948), aff’d, 275 App. Div. 695, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1st Dept. 1949). 
 87 See id. at 576.. 
 88 See id. at 576–78. 
 89 See id. at 576. 
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themes contained therein and thus falsely implied that they were 
disloyal to their country.90 
The court rejected these arguments, first stating that “[t]he use 
of the music can best be described as incidental, background 
matter.”91  The court noted that the arguments set forth in the claim 
inevitably led to the doctrine of moral rights.92  The application of 
the doctrine, said the court, presented much difficulty, especially in 
a case in which there was “no charge of distortion of the 
compositions nor any claim that they have not been faithfully 
reproduced.”93  The court noted that the state of the law was 
unclear as to the norm by which the work should be tested and the 
proper remedy to be granted.94  In considering the test that should 
be applied, the court asked, “Is the standard to be good taste, 
artistic worth, political beliefs, moral concepts or what is it to 
be?”95 
Shostakovich is an example of the attempted use of the right of 
integrity to remedy an injury to the artist’s reputation.96  It may be 
that composers such as those involved in the case should have 
some means of protection from this sort of harm.97  However, 
DaSilva notes that, even in France, “the broad extension of [the 
moral right of integrity] to achieve that purpose is of questionable 
legal basis, [because] scholars still question whether protection of 
the artist’s reputation—as opposed to protection of the work 
itself—is an appropriate application of [droit moral].”98 
A more recent example of an American court refusing to 
extend moral rights doctrine to protect against the 
decontextualization of a musical work is Franconero v. Universal 
Music Corp.99  Franconero was a famous singer in the 1950s and 
1960s and the defendants, UMG, were free to license Franconero’s 
 
 90 See id. at 578. 
 91 Id. at 576. 
 92 See id. at 578. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See id. at 578–79. 
 95 Id. at 579. 
 96 DaSilva, supra note 9, at 3. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 70 U.S.P.Q.2D 1398 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 18, 2003). 
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music because there were no “contractual restrictions to the 
contrary.”100  In the 1990s, UMG issued synch licenses for 
Franconero’s music to be used in the films “Jawbreaker” and 
“Postcards from America.”101  Both films contained scenes of 
homosexuality, suicide, prostitution and rape, which Franconero 
found objectionable.102  The objection to the use of her music in 
such films could very likely be attributed to the fact that, in 1974, 
Franconero was raped and tortured, and after these events she 
suffered from mental anguish, developed drug dependencies and 
also attempted suicide on more than one occasion.103 
In Franconero, since the defendants had contractual rights to 
issue synch licenses, the plaintiff had to rely on non-contract 
theories such as tort law, state civil rights law, and foreign moral 
rights arguments.104  The court noted that “[t]hese buckshot claims 
suffer from the common and obvious fatal flaw that UMG had the 
contractual right to issue the synch licenses that it issued.”105  The 
court dismissed the moral rights claims, holding that United States 
law did not recognize moral rights with respect to musical 
performances, and the court refused to rely on principles of 
international law.106  Also noted was the plaintiff’s concession that 
the songs were not altered or deformed, arguing instead that the 
use of the songs in the films “was enough to distort them and 
subject UMG to a moral rights claim.”107  The court stated, 
“Recognition of such a claim would subject everyone who issues a 
synch license to potential liability under foreign law or would grant 
veto power over licenses to those, like [Franconero], who have 
transferred their rights without reservation.”108  Thus, the decision 
left Franconero without a remedy. 
 
 
 100 Id. at *4–5. 
 101 See id. at *2. 
 102 See id. at *2–3. 
 103 See id. at *2. 
 104 See id. at *5. 
 105 Id. 
 106 See id. at *6. 
 107 Id. at *7. 
 108 Id. 
ANDERSON 5/18/2006  11:34 AM 
886 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:869 
 
B. Advocating for the Extension of Moral Rights to Protect 
Against the Decontextualization of Musical Works 
Cases such as Shostakovich and Franconero illustrate decisions 
that lead to “the common contention that American law has not 
evolved doctrines which adequately protect the artist’s rights of 
personality in his or her own work.”109  Proponents of the 
extension of moral rights doctrine to protect against 
decontextualization of a musical work utilize a variety of 
arguments and often argue that the United States should look to 
France as a model because French law considers 
decontextualization adverse to the artist’s “reputation and honor, 
thereby impairing her legally protected integrity interest.”110  This 
belief is illustrated by the fact that when Shostakovich brought an 
identical claim in France, he succeeded and received an injunction 
enjoining Twentieth Century-Fox from further use of his music.111  
The French court found “that the production company infringed 
upon the artists’ rights of integrity when it injected the music into 
an unintended context.”112 
Proponents of the extension also argue that the general theories 
underlying the moral right doctrine support its application to 
musical works.  One of such theories is that art plays an important 
role in, and is valuable to, society.  The social value of art is 
illustrated by various statements made by Representatives in 
support of the enactment of VARA.113  Representative Markey, for 
example, stated that “[a]rtists in this country play a very important 
role in capturing the essence of culture and recording it for future 
generations.  It is often through art that we are able to see truths, 
both beautiful and ugly.”114  Recognition of the importance of 
 
 109 DaSilva, supra note 9, at 2. 
 110 Francesca Garson, Before that Artist Came Along, It was Just a Bridge: The Visual 
Artists Rights Act and the Removal of Site-Specific Artwork, 11 CORNELL J.L & PUB. 
POL’Y 203, 212 (2001). 
 111 See Soc. Le Chant de Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe et Soc. Fox Americaine Twentieth 
Century, Judgment of Jan. 13, 1953(1953) 1 Gaz. Pal. 191 (1954) D.A. 16, 80 (cour 
d’Appel Paris). 
 112 Garson, supra note 110, at 212. 
 113 See generally H.R. Rep. 
 114 H.R. Rep., supra note 43, at 6916 (citing 135 Cong. Rec. E2227 (daily ed. June 20, 
1989)(statement of Representative Markey). 
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artwork leads to the conclusion that a moral rights doctrine is 
beneficial because it results “in a climate of artistic worth and 
honor that encourages the author in the arduous act of creation.”115  
Thus, the argument goes, the societal value of art requires that 
artists be encouraged to create, which may be achieved by 
developing a moral rights doctrine.116 
Those who believe musicians should also enjoy moral rights in 
their work argue that music is also highly valued by society and 
should thus be protected.117  Desai argues that “music can inspire 
and deeply affect people’s lives,” and when a “song is played and 
used out of context, such use desecrates the song, musician, and 
listeners.”118  Inherent in this line of argument is the idea that there 
is no reason to protect only the visual arts and that musicians 
should also be protected by legislation such as VARA.119  
Proponents of this type of extension argue that, although protection 
of pecuniary interests may encourage musicians to create new 
works, providing musicians with additional moral rights 
protections would be more effective.120  Russell J. DaSilva notes 
that the failure of the federal government to create such moral 
rights for musicians may establish “a legal notion of intellectual 
property which puts the rights of the copyright proprietor above the 
rights of the artistic creator.  By ignoring moral rights, federal law 
creates a fundamentally ‘amoral’ copyright.”121 
Finally, some argue that moral rights protections against 
decontextualization are necessary for musicians in particular due to 
certain unique aspects of the music industry, which leave 
musicians vulnerable to violations of their moral rights.122  
Musicians may often find their interests ignored once they have 
signed a recording contract.123  With regards to 
decontextualization, however, the most pertinent aspects of the 
 
 115 Id. at 6915. 
 116 See Liemer, supra note 10, at 3. 
 117 See Desai, supra note 3, at 3. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See id. at 20. 
 120 See id. 
 121 DaSilva, supra note 9, at 6. 
 122 See generally Desai, supra note 2. 
 123 See supra Part I(C). 
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music industry are performance rights societies and their ability to 
issue synch licenses.124 
Although performance rights societies protect musicians in that 
they ensure that artists will receive royalty payments for the use of 
their songs, it is argued that such organizations “fail to protect use 
of musical works outside the context of their meaning, and in 
providing blanket licenses, may affect the interest of musicians 
negatively.”125  Desai notes that “any musician would be wise to 
join a performance rights society, but in doing so, the musician 
allows another entity to decide in what context the public 
performance of his or her song occurs.”126  Thus, artists may find 
their music incorporated into visual works or being performed in 
contexts which the artist does “not feel articulate the artistic vision 
of their creation.”127  An extension of moral rights, it is said, would 
alleviate such problems. 
C. Rajan Desai’s Proposed Moral Rights Scheme 
Desai argues for an extension of moral rights doctrine to 
protect musicians against decontextualization of their musical 
works and proposes a moral rights scheme that could be 
implemented in the U.S.128  The first aspect of Desai’s scheme 
involves the amending of the United States copyright code to 
require artist consent for synch licenses.129  Desai notes that this 
right could be waived in a contract, but that the mere codification 
of the right would “make the artist more comfortable with contract 
negotiations and provide more control for the artist over his or her 
work.”130  This prong of Desai’s scheme deals exclusively with the 
relationship between the artist and the record company. 
The second prong of Desai’s proposed moral rights scheme 
addresses the issue of musicians losing control of how their music 
is used via performance licenses issued by performance rights 
 
 124 Id. 
 125 Desai, supra note 3, at 8. 
 126 Id. at 21. 
 127 Id. 
 128 See id. at 21–23. 
 129 See id. at 21. 
 130 Id. 
ANDERSON 5/18/2006  11:34 AM 
2006] DECONTEXTUALIZATION OF MUSICAL WORKS 889 
 
societies.131  Desai suggests that musicians be given a cause of 
action based on the moral right of integrity in order to control how 
their music is used and prevent the use of their music in a context 
that they find objectionable.132  Desai explains that the moral rights 
action would rarely be used,133 but that the cause of action should 
exist so that if an artist finds that one of his songs is being used in a 
way that is offensive to him, he could prevent further use of the 
song in that particular manner.134  Under Desai’s scheme, the artist 
would have a claim against the licensor-performance rights society 
as well as the licensee.135  Desai notes that the proper remedy 
would be an injunction because “one cannot expect the licensor 
and licensee to sense the artistic vision of a musician and know the 
appropriate context for performance of a song. . .”136  The initial 
remedy would thus be an injunction, and if the use of the song 
persisted, the musician could then seek damages.137  The final 
aspect of this prong of Desai’s proposed moral rights scheme is 
that “a waiver provision could exist to allow an artist to forego any 
future moral rights, and give liberty to performance rights societies 
and the artist.”138  Desai thus allows for the waiver of both of his 
proposed solutions. 
Desai uses Bruce Springsteen’s song “Born in the U.S.A.” to 
illustrate how this proposed moral rights scheme would work in 
application.139  The song is meant to be critical of the United States 
government in telling the story of a “disillusioned Vietnam War 
Veteran,”140 but Desai states that the song, if misunderstood, could 
 
 131 See id.  One may question why, in order to retain control over how their music is 
used, a musician would not simply forgo becoming a member of a performance rights 
society such as ASCAP or BMI.  However, Desai explains that “These groups provide a 
valuable service of monitoring use of songs and providing economic returns.  A musician 
would act foolishly by not enrolling in one of these groups, and likely, a record company 
would act foolishly if it allowed an artist on its label to not join one of these groups.”  Id. 
 132 See id. at 22. 
 133 See id.  This is so, Desai states, “. . .because an artist cannot be expected to 
extensively police use of his or her musical works.” Id. 
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 See id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See generally Desai, supra note 3. 
 140 Id. at 22. 
ANDERSON 5/18/2006  11:34 AM 
890 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:869 
 
be used in stadiums to incite feelings of patriotism.141  Under 
Desai’s model, “[i]f Springsteen could show that his song has been 
used outside the context of his artistic vision for it, and the use has 
offended his integrity, . . . [he could] get an injunction against the 
particular licensor and licensee for the specific use in question.”142 
III. UNWORKABLE PROPOSALS AND FLAWED ARGUMENTS: 
PROPONENTS FAIL TO MAKE A STRONG  
CASE FOR EXTENSION 
The argument that musicians deserve greater control over their 
work is compelling because granting such artists protection and 
control will likely encourage them to create new works.  However, 
the proposals set forth and the arguments relied upon by 
proponents of moral rights protections against the 
decontextualization of musical works are fatally flawed.  In 
particular, the specific flaws in Desai’s proposed moral right 
scheme and the mistaken reliance on VARA, utilized by many 
proponents of the extension of moral rights, are discussed below.  
Unless stronger arguments are made and more workable standards 
suggested, moral rights should not be extended to protect 
musicians against the decontextualization of their work. 
A. Desai’s Problematic Moral Rights Scheme 
Although Desai seeks a solution that would ideally result in 
additional control for musicians over their work, his proposal does 
not set forth a workable standard for the protection against 
decontextualization of musical works.  First, Desai’s scheme is far 
too broad and fails to address a standard that should be applied by 
courts if a moral rights cause of action were, in fact, created.  Desai 
states that a court should grant an injunction if an artist can show a 
violation of integrity or that his “song has been used outside the 
context of his artistic vision for it.”143  Such a statement completely 
neglects, however, any explanation of how a court would 
 
 141 See id. 
 142 See id. at 22–23. 
 143 Id. at 22. 
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determine whether there had been such a violation of the artist’s 
vision for his work.  This was a fundamental objection of the 
American court that dismissed Shostakovich, asking whether the 
standard should be “good taste, artistic worth, political beliefs, 
moral concepts” or some other standard.144  Interestingly, Desai 
never refers to Shostakovich.145 
Shostakovich and Franconero illustrate the wide array of cases 
that could fall within the protection of Desai’s broad moral rights 
scheme.  In Shostakovich, the plaintiffs argued that the use of their 
music implied something false about their political beliefs, i.e., that 
they were disloyal to their government.  In Franconero, however, 
the plaintiff did not seem to argue that the use of her music created 
any false implications about her.  Rather, Franconero simply found 
the use of her work in such a context “objectionable.”  Should a 
court grant an injunction simply because the artist does not agree, 
generally, with the use of their work in a certain context?  Or 
should an artist be required to show that the decontextualization 
had the same effect as making a false statement about him, 
bringing his claim closer to one of defamation?  If so, would the 
false implication be grounded on the subjective146 belief of the 
artist?  Or would the standard be whether a reasonable person 
would believe that the use of a musical work created the 
implication asserted by the artist?  Such questions demonstrate that 
there is a huge rift in Desai’s proposed scheme.  Desai leaps from 
creating a cause of action to describing the remedy without 
explaining what, exactly, an artist should have to show in order to 
prove that his moral rights had been violated by the 
decontextualization of his work. 
The second major flaw in Desai’s proposed scheme is that he 
allows for the waiver, via contract, of both of the rights his scheme 
 
 144 Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 579 (Sup. Ct. 
1948), aff’d, 275 App. Div. 695, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1st Dept. 1949). 
 145 In fact, Desai states that “[h]ypothetically, an artist could find their song used in a 
certain scene in a movie they do not want their song used in.”  Desai, supra note 3, at 21.  
And yet this is exactly what happened in Shostakovich. 
 146 DaSilva notes, “[T]he right of integrity, in the end, is based on artistically subjective 
judgments which are inappropriate to judicial examination, for French courts, like 
American courts, are reluctant to pass judgment on literary or artistic merit.” DaSilva, 
supra note 9, at 37. 
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creates—the right of the artist to require that he give consent 
before a license is issued for the use of his work, and the moral 
right of an artist to stop an individual from using his work in a 
manner which the artist finds objectionable.  Before proposing his 
moral rights scheme, however, Desai notes that “many new 
musicians sign whatever agreement they get in order to ensure 
some recording deal.”147  Desai argues that the codification of the 
first right and the development of a cause of action for the second 
would give the artist more comfort in the negotiating process.  
Although this may be true, it still seems unlikely that the artist 
seeking a contract with a recording company, given the customs of 
the recording industry previously mentioned, would refuse to 
waive the right.  Thus, by providing for a waiver, Desai takes away 
the rights that he attempts to give the artist via the proposed moral 
rights scheme. 
Desai appears to approve of the very liberal doctrine of droit 
moral in France, and is thus inconsistent in proposing a scheme 
that allows for waiver of his consent requirements and moral rights 
claim. After all, droit moral, “is deemed by statute to be ‘personal, 
perpetual, inalienable, and unassignable’ and at least in theory, it 
cannot be abandoned by the author by contract or will.”148 Even 
VARA, which allows for the waiver of the moral rights granted to 
visual artists, would not allow for the type of waiver granted by 
Desai’s moral rights scheme.  The waiver permitted by VARA 
“applies only to the specific person to whom the waiver is made,” 
149 and cannot be transferred to a third party.150 In addition, the 
written instrument by which the artist waives his moral rights 
“must specifically identify the work and the uses of the work to 
which the waiver applies”, and the waiver will “apply only to that 
work and those uses.”151  Thus, VARA does not permit blanket 
waivers. 
 
 147 Desai, supra note 3, at 18. 
 148 Id. at 4–5 (quoting Loi du 11 mars 1957 Sur La Propiété Littéraire Artistique, [1957] 
J.O., translated in UNESCO, Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World (1976), Article 
6. 
 149 H.R. Rep. 101–514, H.R. Rep. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1990, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6928–29 (1990).  
 150 See id. at 6929. 
 151 Id. 
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If VARA were extended to protect musicians, Desai’s 
proposed process of contracting to waive moral rights would not be 
permitted.  VARA does not provide for blanket waivers and 
requires an artist to waive his or her rights in a written instrument 
for each licensee.  Desai, however, mistakenly suggests that an 
artist could contract with performance rights societies to give them 
freedom in issuing licenses.  Desai also suggests that an artist who 
did not waive his rights could have a cause of action against the 
performance rights society as well as the licensee.  If VARA 
applied to musicians, however, the artist could not sign a blanket 
waiver with the performance rights society, who would then 
transfer the waiver to the licensees.  The waiver aspects of Desai’s 
proposed scheme are thus unlikely to be adopted by the legislature 
or courts.  More importantly, the allowance of waivers run contrary 
to Desai’s liberal stance on moral rights in that the waivers are 
highly likely to be used in the music industry and therefore negate 
any protection that Desai attempts to create for musicians. 
B. Proponents Mistakenly Rely on VARA 
Desai and other scholars who argue for the extension of moral 
rights to protect against the decontextualization of musical works 
make a grave mistake in basing their arguments on VARA.  They 
argue that music is just as valuable as the visual arts and also 
deserves protection under federal legislation. This reasoning does 
not support the argument that musicians should be protected 
against decontextualization because it is not clear that the 
decontextualization, or relocation, of a work of visual art would 
constitute a violation of an artist’s rights under VARA.152 This 
section of the discussion should not necessarily be read to support 
the protections and limitations set forth in VARA.  It merely seeks 
to illustrate that proponents of extending VARA to protect 
musicians wrongly assume that the extension would provide for 
protection against decontextualization of musical works. 
The legislative history of VARA, particularly the House Report 
of the Committee on the Judiciary, suggests that the 
decontextualization of an artist’s work, thereby implying a false 
 
 152 See id. at 6928–29. 
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fact about the artist, would not be a violation of the amendment.  
The report states: 
[T]he best approach to construing the term ‘honor or 
reputation’ . . . is to focus on the artistic or professional 
honor or reputation of the individual as embodied in the 
work that is protected.  The standard used is not analogous 
to that of a defamation case, where the general character of 
the plaintiff is at issue.  In a suit for a violation of the rights 
accorded under [VARA], any evidence with regard to the 
latter is irrelevant.153 
This statement suggests that even if VARA protected 
musicians, it would not protect an artist asserting a claim such as 
that asserted by the plaintiffs in Shostakovich.  The plaintiffs there 
would not be able to rely on the argument that the use of their 
music in “The Iron Curtain” implied that they were disloyal to the 
Soviet government.  This is because the argument is very similar to 
a defamation claim, asserting that the falsity implied via the 
context of the music harmed the artists’ reputations.  This type of 
evidence seems to be exactly what the Committee on the Judiciary 
classified as irrelevant. 
The reasons given for limiting the scope of VARA also 
indicate that the statute was not intended to protect a visual artist 
from the decontextualization or relocation of his or her work, and 
therefore would not, contrary to what proponents of the extension 
suggest, protect musicians against decontextualization of their 
work.  Congress limited the works of visual art covered by the 
amendment to originals, i.e., “works created in single copies or in 
limited editions.”154  The reasons for limiting the scope of the 
amendment were primarily based on the “critical factual and legal 
differences in the way visual arts and audiovisual works are 
created and disseminated.”155 
The Committee on the Judiciary specifically mentioned 
differences such as the fact that works of visual art created in 
single copies or limited editions “are generally not physically 
 
 153 Id. at 6925. 
 154 Id. at 6919. 
 155 Id. 
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transformed to suit the purposes of different markets.  Further, 
when an original of a work of visual art is modified or destroyed, it 
cannot be replaced.  This is not the case when one copy of a work 
produced in potentially unlimited copies is altered.”156 In seems 
undeniable that such language intends only to protect the integrity 
of the work itself from distortion or mutilation, rather than the 
artist from the harm of having his or her work used in a manner 
which the artist finds objectionable. 
Finally, the language of the amendment itself suggests that it 
would not protect an artist against the decontextualization of his or 
her work of visual art, and thus, if extended, would not do so for 
musicians.  Within the VARA is a list of exceptions to what will be 
considered a violation of the right of integrity.  Most importantly, 
the list of exceptions states that the modification of a work that is 
the result of “the public presentation, including lighting and 
placement, of the work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation, 
or other modification . . . unless the modification is caused by 
gross negligence.”157  This suggests that once an individual or 
entity has permission to display a work of visual art, they are given 
liberty in choose how to do so, so long as that presentation does 
not include a physical modification or distortion of the work.  By 
analogy, it seems that the decontextualization of musical would not 
be protected if VARA were extended.  That is, once a license is 
granted to use a musical work, the licensee would have the 
freedom to choose how to present the work so long as such a 
presentation of the work did not substantially change or distort the 
music, for example the melody or lyrics.  Thus, if Congress 
amended VARA to protect musicians, it seems the amendment 
would not prevent the decontextualization of a musical work.  This 
is yet another flaw in the arguments used by proponents of such an 
extension. 
Few courts have had to address whether the relocation of a 
work of visual art, or the changing of its surroundings, would be a 
violation of the rights established by VARA when the work itself 
is not damaged.  It seems, however, that courts are unlikely to 
 
 156 Id. 
 157 17 USCA § 106A(c)(2). 
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apply VARA to works that have not suffered a physical mutilation 
or distortion.  Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc.158 serves as an 
excellent example.  In that case, a sculptor had created sculptures 
to be presented in a park.  He sought an injunction, under VARA, 
preventing the owners of the park from relocating one of his 
sculptures.159  The sculptor argued that his work was “site-
specific” and that the location of the sculpture was a “constituent 
element of the work.”160  Plaintiff argued that the relocating of 
sculpture would thus destroy the work.  The sculptor offered an 
alternative argument that the park as a whole was a work of visual 
art and thus could not be modified.  The court rejected the 
argument that the park would constitute a work of visual art under 
VARA.161  The court also rejected the argument that the sculptor’s 
“site-specific” work was protected by VARA because the plain 
language of the statute excludes the right to the “placement or 
public presentation” of a work of visual art.162  The court noted 
that the VARA provision excluding public presentation “has been 
interpreted to exclude from VARA’s protection ‘site-specific’ 
works, works that would be modified if they were moved.163 
Although only a limited number of courts have addressed the 
issue of whether VARA protects the relocation of “site-specific” 
work, it seems unlikely that courts will interpret the amendment to 
protect against this kind of decontextualization.  This is yet another 
example of the inherent flaws in the argument that VARA should 
be extended to protect musicians and grant a right to prevent the 
 
 158 288 F.Supp.2d 89 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 159 See id. at 92. 
 160 Id. at 95. 
 161 See id. at 99. 
 162 See id. at 100. 
 163 Id. at 99 (citing Board of Managers of Soho Int’l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, 
2003 WL 21403333, *10 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that the point of VARA “is not . . . to 
preserve a work of visual art where it is, but rather to preserve the work as it is”)).  It 
should be noted, however, that the Phillips court held that, under “broader protections of 
state law, Plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success in showing that he has the 
right to prevent the alteration of his site-specific sculptures that would result from 
moving them to another location.  There is no provision in the written contract between 
the artist and the purchaser waiving this right.”  Id. at 92–93.  Such a holding suggests 
that proponents of the extension of moral rights to protect against the decontextualization 
of musical works might find more success in basing their arguments on state law rather 
than VARA. 
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decontextualization of musical works.  The legislative history, 
language, and judicial interpretation of the amendment suggest that 
such a right does not currently exist for visual artists, and thus 
would not exist for musicians if the statute were extended. 
CONCLUSION 
Consideration of the development of moral rights protections in 
the United States reveals that the extension of moral rights doctrine 
seems unlikely.  If it is possible to convince the legislature and 
courts to extend the law to protect musicians more adequately, 
only the strongest arguments for extension will do so.  Thus far, 
proponents have not implemented arguments of the requisite 
strength for the extension of moral rights to protect against 
decontextualization of musical works.  Moral rights doctrine is 
unlikely to be, and should not be, extended until workable moral 
rights schemes and compelling arguments are presented. 
 
 
